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LAIZURE V. AVANTE AT LEESBURG: A WRONG TURN ON THE ROAD 
TO VINDICATING NURSING HOME RESIDENTS’ RIGHTS 
Joseph S. Miller 
INTRODUCTION 
There are currently 684 nursing homes in Florida with an estimated 72,000 
residents paying an average of $223 per day or nearly $81,395 annually for elderly 
care.1 Harry Stewart was one of the 72,000 Floridians in need of extended care 
after undergoing knee surgery in 2006.2 In the hospital, after surgery, Stewart was 
persuaded by a representative of Avante at Leesburg (“Avante”) to continue his 
recovery at Avante.3 At the time of Stewart’s discharge from the hospital on May 
14, 2006, his white blood cell count was normal and he was showing no signs of 
infection from the knee surgery.4 On May 15, 2006, at Avante, Stewart was 
presented with an “Agreement for Care” which included an “Arbitration 
Agreement” that Stewart signed without first consulting with his family, counsel, 
or independent representative.5 The agreement Stewart signed called for all 
disputes or claims arising out of his stay at Avante or claims regarding the 
“Agreement for Care” to be decided by binding arbitration, and all claims by his 
heirs, beneficiaries, or his estate would also be subject to arbitration.6 
On May 16, 2006, two days after arriving at Avante, Stewart’s knee became 
seriously infected and his white blood cell count had undertaken a drastic 
reduction—Stewart died on May 18, 2006.7 Stewart’s daughter Deborah Laizure, 
acting as Stewart’s personal representative, brought a number of claims against 
Avante for negligence and deprivation of statutory rights, but her claim for the 
wrongful death of her father is the key issue in this note.8 Shortly after Laizure 
filed her claims, Avante filed a motion to compel  arbitration of all Laizure’s 
 ________________________  
  J.D. Candidate 2015, Barry University Dwayne O. Andreas School of Law. Special thanks to attorney 
Melissa Polo esq. for all her guidance throughout the research and writing process. I would also like to thank Prof. 
Heather Kolinsky for sharing her years of experience in legal writing. Finally, I am grateful to have the support of 
my family, friends, and girlfriend “Nicki” throughout my years in law school.  
 1. Facts About Long Term Care in Florida, FLORIDA HEALTH CARE ASSOCIATION, 
http://www.fhca.org/media_center/long_term_health_care_facts/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2013). 
 2. See Brief for Petitioner at 1, Laizure v. Avante at Leesburg, Inc., 109 So. 3d 752 (Fla. 2013) (No. 
SC10-2132). 
 3. Id.  
 4. Id.  
 5. Id. at 1–2. 
 6. Id. at 2–6. Stewart was the only person to sign the agreement, his personal representative Deborah 
Laizure never signed the agreement, and the agreement never mentioned wrongful death claims. The 
representative that presented the “Agreement for Care” had no legal training and did not know what the term 
“binding arbitration” meant.  Id.  
 7. See Brief for Petitioner at 2–3, Laizure, 109 So. 3d 752 (No. SC10-2132). 
 8. Id. at 4–5. 
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claims predicated on the arbitration agreement signed by Mr. Stewart; and the 
Circuit Court for Lake County agreed, granting the motion.9 Laizure appealed, and 
the Fifth District Court of Appeal of Florida affirmed the circuit court’s decision 
and presented a certified question to the Supreme Court of Florida: “DOES THE 
EXECUTION OF A NURSING HOME ARBITRATION AGREEMENT BY A 
PARTY WITH THE CAPACITY TO CONTRACT, BIND THE PATIENT’S 
ESTATE AND STATUTORY HEIRS IN A SUBSEQUENT WRONGFUL 
DEATH ACTION ARISING FROM AN ALLEGED TORT WITHIN THE 
SCOPE OF AN OTHERWISE VALID ARBITRATION AGREEMENT?”10 
Unfortunately for the 72,000 Florida families that have or are thinking about 
placing a loved one in an extended care facility or nursing home, the Court 
answered the certified question in the affirmative.11 The Court’s decision does not 
follow the Florida Legislature’s intent when it enacted the Wrongful Death Act 
because the statute has “long [been] characterized . . . as creating a new and distinct 
right of action from the right of action the decedent had prior to death.”12 Stewart’s 
daughter never signed the admissions contract, and she, not Stewart, brought a 
claim for the wrongful death of her father, which Floridians have declared an 
independent cause of action.13  This note argues that the Court’s decision has 
stripped Floridians of their long recognized state and federal constitutional right to 
a jury trial.14 This note further argues that mandatory and binding arbitration 
clauses in nursing home contracts are unconscionable and against public policy. 
Unless proper methods are used in educating new patients as to the rights that they 
are signing away by agreeing to these draconian terms, family members of loved 
ones that have died as a result of a nursing home’s negligence will be left with few 
options for redress. 
Part I of this note discusses Florida’s Wrongful Death Act and how it creates 
an independent cause of action in the party making a claim under the statute. Part I 
also gives a brief history of arbitration, the procedural rules, and any advantages or 
disadvantages to arbitration. Part I concludes with a synopsis of how Florida courts 
 ________________________  
 9. Id. at 7. The circuit court judge identified the fact that he was faced with an issue of first impression, 
but he responded in a very peculiar way: “Well, the big issue is whether or not the heirs, as intended beneficiaries, 
are bound by it such that their independent cause of action for wrongful death is bound by the arbitration 
agreement. They’re intended beneficiaries. You’ve got freedom to contract. I think they’re bound by it.” Id. at 9 
(emphasis added). 
 10. Laizure v. Avante at Leesburg, Inc., 44 So. 3d 1254, 1259 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010). 
 11. Laizure v. Avante at Leesburg, Inc., 109 So. 3d 752, 754 (Fla. 2013). 
 12. Id. at 759 (quoting Toombs v. Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc., 833 So. 2d 109, 111 (Fla. 2002) (emphasis 
added)). 
 13. Id. at 755, 757–58. 
 14. U.S. CONST. amend. VII  
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the 
right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise 
reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common 
law. 
Id. Fla. CONST. art. I, § 22 (West, Westlaw through Nov. 2012 General Election) (“The right of trial by jury shall 
be secure to all and remain inviolate. The qualifications and the number of jurors, not fewer than six, shall be fixed 
by law”).   
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have dealt with arbitration clauses in nursing home admissions contracts in the 
past. Part II breaks down the Supreme Court of Florida’s opinion and how it 
answered the certified question presented. Additionally, Part II presents an 
overview of how other states with similar wrongful death statutes have decided this 
issue. Finally, Part II concludes with recommendations for changes.  
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.   Florida’s Wrongful Death Act 
Florida’s Legislature has expressly provided in the wrongful death statute that 
“[i]t is the public policy of the [S]tate to shift the losses resulting when wrongful 
death occurs from the survivors of the decedent to the wrongdoer.”15 The Act 
provides for a cause of action that may be brought by a decedent’s representative, 
heirs, or estate when the decedent’s death is caused by another person’s negligence, 
wrongful act, default, or breach of contract or warranty: 
When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act, 
negligence, default, or breach of contract or warranty of any 
person, including those occurring on navigable waters, and the 
event would have entitled the person injured to maintain an action 
and recover damages if death had not ensued, the person or 
watercraft that would have been liable in damages if death had not 
ensued shall be liable for damages as specified in this act 
notwithstanding the death of the person injured, although death 
was caused under circumstances constituting a felony.16 
The next section of the Act provides the Legislature’s intent in making the Act 
an independent legal cause of action distinct from the decedent: 
The action shall be brought by the decedent’s personal 
representative, who shall recover for the benefit of the decedent’s 
survivors and estate all damages, as specified in this act, caused by 
the injury resulting in death. When a personal injury to the 
decedent results in death, no action for the personal injury shall 
survive, and any such action pending at the time of death shall 
abate. . . . A defense that would bar or reduce a survivor’s 
recovery if she or he were the plaintiff may be asserted against the 
survivor, but shall not affect the recovery of any other survivor.17 
The first section allows for any typical personal injury defenses such as 
contributory negligence or assumption of the risk, and the second section creates a 
 ________________________  
 15. FLA. STAT. § 768.17 (2006). 
 16. FLA. STAT. § 768.19 (2006) (emphasis added). 
 17. FLA. STAT. § 768.20 (2006) (emphasis added). 
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new cause of action in the decedent’s personal representative.18 The damages that 
may be awarded under the Act are also indicative of the Legislature’s intent to 
make wrongful death claims independent and distinct causes of action: “The 
amounts awarded to each survivor and to the estate shall be stated separately in the 
verdict.”19 
A plain reading of the Act makes the Legislature’s intent clear. The Supreme 
Court of Florida has made its purpose in construing a statute very clear: “A court’s 
purpose in construing a statute is to give effect to legislative intent, which is the 
polestar that guides the court in statutory construction.”20 However, the court did 
not follow the “polestar” and decided to take a different path, completely ignoring 
the Legislature’s express intent.21 
B.   Arbitration 
1.   The Federal Arbitration Act 
The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) was enacted in 1925 and then reformed 
and codified in 1947 as title 9 of the United States Code.22 The FAA was intended 
to reverse the long-standing judicial resentment towards arbitration that had existed 
in English Common Law and transferred to American courts.23 Congress intended 
to put arbitration agreements on the same footing as other contracts when it enacted 
the FAA.24 The Supreme Court of the United States recognizes only two limitations 
on the validity of arbitration agreements: (1) “they must be part of a . . . contract 
‘evidencing a transaction involving commerce’ . . .”; and (2) “such clauses may be 
revoked upon ‘grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract.’”25 
In 2006, the Court gave a more decisive definition of the second limitation by 
explaining how the limitation can be broken down into two challenges: (1) 
challenges to the validity of the agreement to arbitrate; and (2) challenges to the 
contract as a whole, “either on a ground that directly affects the entire agreement 
(e.g., the agreement was fraudulently induced), or on the ground that the illegality 
of one of the contract’s provisions renders the whole contract invalid.”26 The Court 
then articulated three key principles for state courts to follow when reviewing 
challenges to arbitration agreements.27  
 ________________________  
 18. See Toombs, 833 So. 2d at 111. 
 19. FLA. STAT. § 768.22 (2006). 
 20. Gomez v. Vill. of Pinecrest, 41 So. 3d 180, 185 (Fla. 2010). 
 21. See discussion, infra Part II. 
 22. See Gilmer v. Interstate Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991). 
 23. Id.  
 24. Id. 
 25. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1984). 
 26. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 444 (2006). 
 27. Id. at 445. 
4
Barry Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 7
https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol20/iss1/7
Fall 2014 Vindicating Nursing Home Residents’ Rights 135 
First, as a matter of substantive federal arbitration law, an 
arbitration provision is severable from the remainder of the 
contract. Second, unless the challenge is to the arbitration clause 
itself, the issue of the contract’s validity is considered by the 
arbitrator. . . . Third, this arbitration law [and the FAA] appl[y] in 
state as well as federal courts.28  
Thus, Florida courts must keep these federal provisions in mind when deciding 
issues regarding the validity of arbitration agreements in nursing home contracts; 
but the courts can only decide these issues when the arbitration clause is 
challenged. 
2.   The Florida Arbitration Code 
Arbitration clauses in nursing home admissions contracts in Florida are subject 
to the Florida Arbitration Code (“FAC”), to the extent the FAC is not in conflict 
with the FAA.29 The same three-step process that is used by the Supreme Court of 
the United States when deciding issues involving motions to compel arbitration is 
used by Florida courts under the FAC.30 Florida courts consider the following 
issues: “(1) whether a valid written agreement to arbitrate exists; (2) whether an 
arbitral issue exists; and (3) whether the right to arbitration was waived.”31 The 
issue of whether a valid written agreement to arbitrate exists is controlled by 
Florida contract law, and the applicable defenses are unconscionability, fraud, 
duress, illegality, and public policy.32 Accordingly, one would think that anyone 
bringing a wrongful death claim against a nursing home would have no problem 
showing that an arbitration agreement signed by a patient does not even apply to a 
wrongful death action, yet the Supreme Court of Florida does not feel that way.  
Arbitrating a civil claim in Florida puts the plaintiff at a disadvantage when 
compared to having the claim heard in court.33 The American Health Lawyers 
Association (“AHLA”) is a large alternative dispute company in Florida that 
handles the majority of claims arising out of nursing home litigation.34 The AHLA 
has even gone so far as requiring plaintiffs to show a higher level of proof for 
claims brought under Florida’s Nursing Home Resident’s Rights Act and not 
awarding consequential, exemplary, incidental, punitive, or special damages.35 
However, AHLA and Florida nursing homes know that Florida is bound by the 
 ________________________  
 28. Id. at 445–46. 
 29. See Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp., 750 So. 2d 633, 635 (Fla. 1999). 
 30. Id. at 636. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See Shotts v. OP Winter Haven, Inc., 86 So. 3d 456, 464–65 (Fla. 2011). 
 33. See generally Blankfeld v. Richmond Health Care, Inc., 902 So. 2d 296, 297 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) 
(en banc) (reversing a motion to compel arbitration because the arbitration procedure substantially limits statutory 
created remedies and is void as contrary to public policy). 
 34. Id.  
 35. Id. at 298 (“In any claim brought pursuant to this part alleging a violation of resident’s rights or 
negligence causing injury to or death of a resident, the claimant shall have the burden of proving by a 
preponderance of the evidence ….”) (emphasis added); See FLA. STAT. § 400.023(2) (2008). 
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provisions of the FAA favoring arbitration. The Fourth District Court of Appeal of 
Florida’s Chief Justice Farmer summed up the dilemma: “The health care provider 
has different interests, which might even become antagonistic to the patient. It 
would be unprecedented to allow someone who may have adversarial interests 
dealing at arm’s length to make such personal decisions for someone.”36 
C.   Arbitration Clauses in Nursing Home Agreements Prior to Laizure 
In 1980, the Florida Legislature officially took notice of the substandard 
conditions in Florida nursing homes after a Dade County Grand Jury concluded 
that a majority of nursing homes in the county were unsafe and that patient care 
was lacking.37 The Florida Legislature responded by enacting section 400.022, 
Florida Statutes, called the Nursing Home Residents’ Rights Act (“NHRRA”).38 
The NHRRA was established to provide “[d]evelopment, establishment, and 
enforcement of basic standards for[] (1) [t]he health, care, and treatment of persons 
in nursing homes and related health care facilities; and (2) [t]he maintenance and 
operation of such institutions that will ensure safe, adequate, and appropriate care, 
treatment, and health of persons in such facilities.”39 However, nursing homes, 
fearing excess litigation, began to protect their interests by inserting stiff 
mandatory binding arbitration clauses into admissions contracts.40 Thus, a litany of 
litigation over the validity of these agreements ensued.41 
In 2003, the Fourth District Court of Appeal of Florida refused to grant a 
nursing home’s motion to compel arbitration because the agreement was so 
substantively unconscionable.42 In Romano, a husband signed his mentally 
competent wife’s admission contract containing an arbitration agreement that 
waived portions of the NHRRA and certain procedural discovery rules recognized 
by state courts.43 The court found the agreement to be procedurally unconscionable 
because the husband and wife were elderly and neither spouse had legal training.44 
 ________________________  
 36. Id. at 301 (Farmer, CJ., concurring). 
 37. See Troy J. Crotts. The Nursing Home Residents’ Rights Act—A Good Idea Gone Bad!, 26 STETSON  L. 
REV. 599, 605 (1996). 
 38. Id. at 599. 
 39. FLA. STAT. § 400.011 (2008). 
 40. See Linda Khan, Thrown Out of Court: How Corporations Became People You Cannot Sue, 
WASHINGTON MONTHLY MAGAZINE, 
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/junejulyaugust_2014/features/thrown_out_of_court050661.php?pa
ge=all (last visited January 3, 2015). See, e.g., Blankfeld v. Richmond Health Care, Inc., 902 So. 2d 296, 297–98 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).  
 41. See, e.g., Romano ex rel. Romano v. Manor Care Inc., 861 So. 2d 59 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); 
Blankfeld, 902 So. 2d at 296.  
 42. Romano, 861 So. 2d at 64. 
 43. Id. at 61. 
 44. Id. at 63. In Florida, to decline to enforce a contract as unconscionable, the contract must be both 
procedurally and substantively unconscionable. Procedural unconscionability pertains to the individual 
circumstance and context the agreement was entered into, and substantive unconscionability refers to the 
unreasonableness and unfairness of the contract terms. Id. at 62.  
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After Romano, nursing homes in Florida had to be sure their arbitration agreements 
did not restrict their patients’ NHRRA rights. 45 
In 2005, two years after the Fourth District’s decision in Romano, the court 
held healthcare proxies are “not authorized to waive the right to a trial by jury, to 
waive common law remedies, or to agree to modify statutory duties applicable” to 
people receiving healthcare in Florida under the NHRRA.46 In Blankfeld, a senile 
mother allowed her son to sign her admissions agreement as her personal 
representative.47 The agreement contained an arbitration clause calling for all 
disputes to be resolved by binding arbitration administered by the National Health 
Lawyers Association (“NHLA”).48 The NHLA’s arbitration rules limited damages 
provided for in the NHRRA, did not allow for the recovery of attorney’s fees, and 
had a stricter burden of proof than the burden of proof expressly provided in the 
NHRRA.49 The court distinguished its decision in Romano by concluding that this 
arbitration agreement was void as against public policy because a healthcare proxy 
can only make healthcare decisions, and waiving a claimant’s right to trial is not a 
healthcare decision.50 Thus, as of 2005, nursing homes could not circumvent 
challenges to their arbitration agreements by hiring arbitration firms with rules that 
attempt to limit a patient’s or representative’s rights. 
In 2011, the Florida Supreme Court held that a nursing home arbitration 
agreement was not enforceable because it contained a limitation of liability 
provision capping non-economic damages, a provision calling for the arbitrator to 
determine whether the agreement was enforceable, and that the limitation of 
liability was void as against public policy.51 In Gessa, a patient’s daughter acting as 
her attorney-in-fact signed an arbitration agreement that contained a waiver of 
numerous rights under the NHRRA and other statutes.52 The arbitration agreement 
had a clause that made the entire agreement applicable for subsequent visits.53 
During the mother’s second visit, which resulted in negligent care, she filed suit 
against the nursing home for violations of the NHRRA.54 The nursing home filed a 
motion to compel arbitration that was granted by the trial court and affirmed by the 
district court.55 The lower courts believed any unconscionable portions of the 
contract could be severed and the agreement to arbitrate would survive.56 The 
Supreme Court of Florida disagreed with the lower courts and voided the entire 
 ________________________  
 45. See Gessa v. Manor Care of Fla., Inc., 86 So. 3d 484, 492 (Fla. 2011) (citing Shotts v. OP Winter 
Haven, Inc., 86 So. 3d 456, 474 (Fla. 2011). 
 46. Blankfeld, 902 So. 2d at 301. Proxy: “One who is authorized to act as a substitute for another. . . .” 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 610 (9th ed. 2009). 
 47. Blankfeld, 902 So. 2d at 297. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 298–99. 
 50. Id. at 300. 
 51. Gessa v. Manor Care of Fla., Inc., 86 So. 3d 484, 494 (Fla. 2011). 
 52. Id. at 485. 
 53. Id. at 486. 
 54. Id. at 487. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
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agreement, setting a strong precedent in favor of residents and their families’ 
rights.57 However, this grace period would not last long. 
II.  LAIZURE V. AVANTE AT LEESBURG 
A.   Procedural History 
1.   Circuit Court 
On June 16, 2008, Deborah Laizure, Mr. Stewart’s daughter, acting as a 
personal representative of his estate, filed her initial four-count complaint against 
Avante, which was amended two days later.58 The complaint included (1) a claim 
for deprivation of Mr. Stewart’s rights pursuant to the NHRRA; (2) her claim for 
the wrongful death of Mr. Stewart; (3) a claim for deprivation of Mr. Stewart’s 
rights pursuant to the NHRRA against Avante Ancillary Services, Inc., a subsidiary 
of Avante at Leesburg; and (4) her claim for the wrongful death of Mr. Stewart 
against Avante Ancillary Services, Inc.59 Following the filing of the complaint, 
Avante filed a motion to compel arbitration of all claims.60 On April 21, 2009, the 
Circuit Court for Lake County held a hearing on the motion to compel arbitration, 
the motion to dismiss Laizure’s amended complaint, and the motion to stay 
discovery.61  
On May 7, 2009, the circuit court granted Avante’s motion to compel 
arbitration.62 The circuit court found (1) that Mr. Stewart signed the arbitration 
agreement, (2) that the arbitration agreement was valid, (3) the claims brought by 
Laizure on behalf of Mr. Stewart’s estate were arbitrable issues, and (4) the claims 
were subject to the arbitration agreement.63 Finally, the circuit court concluded that 
although Laizure did not sign the agreement, the beneficiaries of “Harry Stewart’s 
Estate” were bound by the arbitration agreement because they were intended third-
party beneficiaries.64 Thus, the circuit court abated the issues pending resolution of 
Laizure’s appeal in the district court.65 
2.   District Court of Appeal 
On appeal to the Fifth District Court of Appeal, Laizure appealed for a reversal 
of the circuit court’s order granting Avante’s motion to compel arbitration of her 
statutory wrongful death and NHRRA claims.66 Laizure argued that the arbitration 
 ________________________  
 57. Gessa, 86 So. 3d at 494. 
 58. See Brief for Petitioner at 4–5, Laizure v. Avante at Leesburg, Inc., 109 So. 3d 752 (Fla. 2013). 
 59. Id. at 4–5. 
 60. Id. at 7. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 8. 
 64. See Brief for Petitioner at 8, Laizure, 109 So. 3d at 752.  
 65. Id. 
 66. Laizure v. Avante at Leesburg, Inc., 44 So. 3d 1254, 1255 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010). 
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agreement does not, and could not, encompass a wrongful death claim because that 
claim did not belong to Mr. Stewart; it was an independent legal cause of action 
that belonged to the estate.67 As a result, Mr. Stewart could not bind the estate and 
his heirs to an agreement that they did not sign.68 The court felt the issue was 
simple and Florida contract law could easily dispose of the issue.69 However, the 
court noted that the issue of whether or not a nursing home patient could bind his 
or her heirs and estate to an arbitration agreement signed by the patient had not 
been decided by any Florida court.70 
The district court looked to the Supreme Court of Florida for guidance and 
relied heavily on a recent opinion where the court held an arbitration agreement in 
a homebuyer’s contract was unenforceable against a wrongful death claim because 
the agreement did not mention claims for torts.71 In Seifert, a husband and wife 
signed a homebuyer’s contract with an arbitration agreement for any contractual 
disagreement arising out of the purchase or construction of their new home.72 The 
husband died due to negligent construction of the home’s air-conditioning vents 
that caused carbon monoxide to ventilate throughout the house.73 The wife brought 
a wrongful death claim against the Home Buyer’s Corporation (“HBC”) for 
causing the death of her husband.74 When the HBC filed a motion to compel 
arbitration, the Supreme Court of Florida reversed the lower court and held the 
agreement unenforceable because the agreement did not contain any language 
regarding claims for personal injury.75 
The district court, relying solely on Seifert, felt it was important to note that 
Seifert did not hold that wrongful death claims are not arbitrable; it held rather that 
if tort claims had been part of the agreement, then the agreement would have been 
arbitrable.76 This is an odd conclusion to reach because Seifert is clearly 
distinguishable from Laizure. First, the issue addressed in Seifert is dissimilar to 
Laizure because in Laizure only one party signed the arbitration agreement: Mr. 
Stewart. Second, Seifert never even reached the issue of whether or not heirs 
bringing a wrongful death claim could be bound by an agreement to arbitrate 
signed solely by the decedent. Third, Seifert never addressed whether or not 
wrongful death claims are independent causes of action or derivative from the 
decedent’s actions. Thus, the district court could not have found anything in Seifert 
that would warrant such a broad assumption that arbitration agreements can bind 
parties that are not, and have never been, part of an agreement to arbitrate. 
The district court then addressed Laizure’s argument that under Florida’s 
Wrongful Death Act, her wrongful death claim has no relation to the arbitration 
 ________________________  
 67. Id. at 1257. 
 68. Id.  
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 1257–58 (citing Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp., 750 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1999)). 
 72. See Seifert, 750 So. 2d at 635. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 642–43.. 
 76. Laizure, 44 So. 3d at 1257–58 (citing Seifert, 750 So. 2d at 642). 
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agreement signed by Mr. Stewart because the claim, by statute, belonged to her.77 
The court turned to the Act, specifically section 768.20, for guidance.78 Oddly, the 
court concluded that under the Act, a wrongful death claim belongs solely to the 
person bringing the claim, but the claim is “derivative” of the wrong committed 
against the decedent.79 The court pointed out that other states have reached the 
same results.80 Next, adding to the confusion, the court acknowledged how other 
states with the same statutory language as Florida’s wrongful death legislation have 
reached the opposite result.81 Thus, the district court, illogically, found that section 
768.20 creates an independent right of action that is derived from the decedent’s 
action if he had survived. In an attempt to resolve the ambiguity, the district court 
certified the issue to the Supreme Court of Florida for further guidance.82  
B.   Deciphering the Opinion 
The Supreme Court of Florida began its analysis of the district court’s certified 
question by examining the arbitration agreement.83 The court acknowledged that 
there are three elements for Florida courts to consider when ruling on a motion to 
compel arbitration: (1) whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists; (2) whether an 
arbitrable issue exists; and (3) whether the right to arbitration was waived.84 The 
court only looked to the first two elements to decide the certified question.85  
1.   Whether a Valid Written Agreement to Arbitrate Exists  
The first part of the court’s analysis addressed Laizure’s argument that as a 
representative of Mr. Stewart’s estate, her wrongful death claims were not within 
the scope of the arbitration agreement.86 The court quickly disposed of the first 
element by comparing Avante’s arbitration agreement to the agreement in Seifert 
and concluded that Avante’s agreement was valid because it included a term for the 
arbitration of tort claims.87 The court found a “significant relationship” between the 
 ________________________  
 77. Id.  
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. All the states that have decided this issue have similar wrongful death statutes that either create an 
independent cause of action or a derivative cause of action. The states with statutes that expressly provide for an 
independent cause of action universally deny agreements to arbitrate wrongful death claims when the decedent 
signed the agreement. However, states with derivative language in their wrongful death legislation will uphold the 
agreement; Florida is the only state to disregard legislative intent. See Pisano v. Extendicare Homes, Inc., 77 A.3d 
651, 659 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013).  
 80. Id. at 1259 (citing In re Labatt Food Serv., L.P., 279 S.W.3d 640 (Tex. 2009) (Texas has a wrongful 
death statute that is derivative of the decedent’s actions); Briarcliff Nursing Home, Inc. v. Turcotte, 894 So. 2d 661 
(Ala. 2004) (Alabama has a wrongful death statute that is derivative of the decedent’s actions)).   
 81. Id. (citing Woodall v. Avalon Care Ctr.-Fed. Way, LLC, 231 P.3d 1252 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010) 
(Washington has a statute that creates an independent cause of action for wrongful death claims); Lawrence v. 
Beverly Manor, 273 S.W.3d 525 (Mo. 2009) (same)).  
 82. Laizure, 44 So. 3d at 1259. 
 83. Laizure v. Avante at Leesburg, Inc., 109 So. 3d 752, 757 (Fla. 2013). 
 84. Id. (citing Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp., 750 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1999)). 
 85. Id.  
 86. Id. at 757–58. 
 87. Id. at 758. Avante’s agreement stated:  
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contract that Mr. Stewart signed and the allegations in Laizure’s complaint because 
the agreement applied to Mr. Stewart’s “heirs” and included all tort claims.88 The 
court concluded, “It is clear that the contracting parties intended to include 
wrongful death claims such as those brought in this case.”89 One might imagine 
how it would be difficult to determine the parties’ intentions in this situation seeing 
how Mr. Stewart’s “heirs” never knew of the arbitration agreement or signed it. 
Yet, the court continued with its analysis without mentioning this aspect.90 
2.   Whether an Arbitrable Issue Exists 
Next, the court addressed the issue of whether a nursing home arbitration 
agreement signed by a nursing home resident, or his or her representative, can bind 
the resident’s estate and statutory heirs to the agreement.91 To answer the second 
prong of the Seifert analysis, the court reviewed the Florida Wrongful Death Act, 
the NHRRA, and analyzed the “nature” of wrongful death claims in Florida.92  
The court began its analysis of the Wrongful Death Act by focusing on the 
language in sections 768.19 and 768.20.93 Section 768.19 establishes the cause of 
action for statutory wrongful death claims.94 The court focused on the statute’s 
language that would entitle a survivor redress for the wrongful death of a family 
member by stating: “The event would have entitled the person injured to maintain 
an action and recover damages if death had not ensued . . . .”95 Next, the court 
looked to section 768.20 which addresses defenses: “A defense that would bar or 
reduce a survivor’s recovery if she or he were the plaintiff may be asserted against 
the survivor, but shall not affect the recovery of any other survivor.”96 Finally, the 
court recognized that the Act created a new right of action that is different from 
any right of action that belonged to the decedent.97  
  
This agreement to arbitrate shall include, but is not limited to, any claim based on … breach 
of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud or misrepresentation, common law or statutory 
negligence, gross negligence, malpractice or a claim based on any departure from accepted 
standards of medical or nursing care (collectively “Disputes”), where the damages or other 
amount in controversy is/are alleged to exceed ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00). This shall 
expressly include, without limitation, claims based on Chapter 400, Florida Statutes, which 
allege damages in excess of ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00). 
Id. at 755.  
 88. Laizure, 109 So. 3d at 758. Avante’s agreement stated: “This agreement shall be binding upon, and 
shall include any claims brought by or against the Parties’ representatives, agents, heirs, assigns, employees, 
managers, directors, shareholders, management companies, subsidiary companies or related affiliated business 
entities.” Id. at 755. 
 89. Id. at 758. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 757. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Laizure, 109 So. 3d at 758–59. 
 94. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 768.19 (2008)). 
 95. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 768.19 (2008)). 
 96. Id. at 758–59 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 768.20 (2008)). 
 97. Id. at 759 (citing Toombs v. Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc., 833 So. 2d 109, 111 (Fla. 2002)). 
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Even though the Act creates an independent claim, the court still reasoned that 
the language from the two sections of the Act created a right of the survivors to 
recover that is based on the decedent’s right to recover.98 The court went back 
twenty years and found support in a decision that barred a wrongful death claim by 
a survivor where the decedent had signed a “release” of liability prior to the 
decedent’s death.99 Next, the court turned to a more recent decision for further 
authority. In Toombs, the court barred recovery for a wrongful death claim 
grounded on the tort doctrine of “dangerous instrumentality” where the decedent 
had no right of action because she was the co-bailee of the vehicle she died in.100 
Finally, the court cited two Florida district court cases from the 1970s that barred 
survivors’ wrongful death claims based on the decedents’ actions in support of the 
court’s conclusion that wrongful death claims in Florida are subject to defenses the 
defendant would have had against the decedent.101 
From the precedent cited, the Court found that “[i]n wrongful death actions in 
Florida, the defendant’s liability flows from actions toward the decedent, and the 
ability of the estate and heirs to recover is predicated on the decedent’s entitlement 
to maintain an action and recover damages if death had not ensued.”102 However, 
the Court pointed out what it thought was a “split” among other states that have 
considered the issue of whether an estate and heirs are bound by arbitration 
agreements signed by decedents in wrongful death claims.103 Finally, the Court 
concluded that, like the states that have derivative language in their wrongful death 
 ________________________  
 98. See id. at 760. 
 99. Laizure, 109 So. 3d at 760 (citing Variety Children’s Hospital v. Perkins, 445 So. 2d 1010, 1011–12 
(Fla. 1983).  
At the moment of his death [the injured party] had no right of action against the tortfeasor 
because this cause of action had already been litigated, proved and satisfied …. Since there 
was no right of action existing at the time of death, under the statute no wrongful death 
cause of action survived the decedent. 
Id.  
 
 100. Id. (citing Toombs, 833 So. 2d at 118).  
 
Although we have long emphasized that an action for wrongful death is distinct from the 
decedent’s action for personal injuries had he or she survived because it involves different 
rights of recovery and damages, the language of the Act makes clear a cause of action for 
wrongful death that is predicated on the decedent’s entitlement to maintain an action and 




 101. See id. at 760 (citing Warren v. Cohen, 363 So. 2d 129, 131 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.1978) (holding that “the 
subsequently filed wrongful death action is barred by release signed by the decedent prior to her death”)); see also 
Ryter v. Brennan, 291 So. 2d 55, 57 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (settlement and general release by decedent barred 
wife’s subsequent wrongful death claims)). 
 102. Id.  at 761. 
 103. Id. The Court has incorrectly identified what they think is a split among other states. As will be 
discussed infra, in Part C, other states simply have wrongful death acts with language that either creates a 
derivative cause of action or an independent cause of action, and thus hold according to the legislative intent of the 
state.  
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statutes, “[t]he nature of a wrongful death cause of action in Florida is derivative in 
the context of determining whether a decedent’s estate and heirs are bound by the 
decedent’s agreement to arbitrate.”104 The Court’s logic for this reasoning is even 
more perplexing than its conclusion: “The estate and heirs stand in the shoes of the 
decedent for purposes of whether the defendant is liable and are bound by the 
decedent’s actions and contracts with respect to defenses and releases.”105  
The obvious problem with the court’s decision is the fact that the estate cannot 
“stand in the shoes” of the decedent if their claim is independent of the decedent. 
Indeed, as the court pointed out, by statute, wrongful death claims are independent 
and belong solely to the heirs or representatives bringing the statutory wrongful 
death claims.106 The authority used by the court to support its conclusion that the 
“nature” of wrongful death claims in Florida is derivative of the decedent’s 
agreement to arbitrate is unfounded. The authority used by the Court speaks of 
common negligence defenses, not choice of forum agreements.107 By affirming the 
lower court’s holding that Mr. Stewart’s estate was a third-party beneficiary of his 
agreement with Avante, the court has frustrated plaintiffs’ claims in the nursing 
home arena of litigation. The court’s decision has stripped litigants’ constitutional 
rights to a jury trial by binding them to an agreement that they were not a witness 
to or signatory of. The other states that have decided this issue can help shine some 
light on the Supreme Court of Florida’s recent decision. 
C.   Other States 
An overview of the cases decided based on those states’ statutory wrongful 
death language shows that courts in states where wrongful death actions are 
accepted as independent and separate causes of action hold that claimants are not 
bound by a decedent’s choice of forum agreement.108 However, in states where the 
 ________________________  
 104. Id. at 762. 
 105. Laizure, 109 So. 3d at 762. 
 106. Id. at 759 (citing Toombs v. Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc., 833 So. 2d 109, 111 (Fla. 2002)). 
 107. See Variety Children’s Hosp. v. Perkins, 445 So. 2d 1010, 1011–12 (Fla. 1983).  
 
At the moment of his death [the injured party] had no right of action against the tortfeasor 
because his cause of action had already been litigated, proved and satisfied. . . . Since there 
was no right of action existing at the time of death, under the statute no wrongful death 




Although we have long emphasized that an action for wrongful death is distinct from the 
decedent’s action for personal injuries had he or she survived because it involves different 
rights of recovery and damages, the language of the Act makes clear a cause of action for 
wrongful death that is predicated on the decedent’s entitlement to maintain an action and 
recover damages if death had not ensued.  
 
Toombs, 833 So. 2d at 118. 
 108. See In re Labatt Food Serv., L.P., 279 S.W.3d 640, 647 (Tex. 2009). 
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applicable statutory language creates a wholly derivative action, courts generally 
hold a decedent’s agreement to arbitrate valid when arbitration is compelled 
against the decedent’s statutory heirs and estate.109  Courts across the United States 
have uniformly held that it is the state legislatures’ intent that controls the issue and 
not the courts’ opinions.110 Thus, a brief overview of other states’ decisions on the 
issue will help to highlight the Supreme Court of Florida’s error in deciding 
Laizure.    
 
1.   Derivative 
In 2009, the Texas Supreme Court held that a deceased son’s parents were 
bound to arbitrate their claim for the wrongful death of their son because under 
Texas law wrongful death beneficiaries are generally bound by a decedent’s pre-
death agreement because of the derivative nature of the claims.111 In Labatt, a 
Texas corporation compensated injured workers through an “occupational injury 
plan,” and in order to receive the benefits of the “plan” each employee had to sign 
an agreement to arbitrate all personal injury claims arising out of his or her 
employment.112 The son was the only person to sign the agreement.113 When the 
son died from an asthma attack while working, his parents brought a claim for his 
wrongful death against his employer, and the employer moved to compel 
arbitration asserting the parents were third-party beneficiaries.114 The parents 
argued that they were not signatories to the agreement and could not be bound by 
it.115 
The trial court and the court of appeals denied the employer’s motion to 
compel arbitration without stating a reason.116 The Supreme Court of Texas looked 
to the text of the state’s wrongful death statute to determine whether the legislature 
intended the statute to create a derivative or independent cause of action.117 The 
court found that Texas’s “Wrongful Death Act expressly conditions the 
beneficiaries’ claims on the decedent’s right to maintain suit for his injuries. The 
legislature created an entirely derivative cause of action . . . .”118 The court treated 
the issue as one of simple statutory construction and legislative intent, reasoning 
that other states with similar statutory language hold the same.119 Thus, under 
Texas statutory law, wrongful death claims are derivative of the decedent’s claim 
 ________________________  
 109. Id. 
 110. See Variety Children’s Hospital v. Perkins, 445 So. 2d 1010, 1012 (Fla. 1983). 
 111. In re Labatt, 279 S.W.3d at 649. 
 112. Id. at 642. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id.  
 116. Id.  
 117. In re Labatt, 279 S.W.3d at 646.  
 118. Id. (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.003(a)). 
 119. Id. at 647. 
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and any agreement to arbitrate that was signed by the decedent applies to his or her 
heirs and estate.120 
Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals of the United States held that 
a nursing home’s arbitration agreement signed by a resident was enforceable 
against the resident’s estate, and the estate’s claims would have to be decided by 
binding arbitration per the agreement.121 In Entrekin, a patient was admitted to an 
Alabama nursing home where she signed an admissions agreement requiring her 
and her estate (or heirs) to arbitrate any claims arising out of her stay with the 
facility.122 After the patient died, the executor of her estate brought an action 
against the nursing home under Alabama’s wrongful death statute for damages.123 
The nursing home filed a motion to compel arbitration, and the district court denied 
the motion.124 The district court interpreted Alabama’s wrongful death precedent in 
a way that would not allow for the executor to be bound by an agreement that he or 
she did not sign.125 
The issue the Eleventh Circuit needed to resolve was the same issue in Laizure: 
whether or not an estate could be bound by an arbitration agreement signed solely 
by a nursing home resident.126 The Eleventh Circuit began its analysis by pointing 
out that whether a claim falls within the scope of an arbitration agreement is a 
matter of state law, and in this case, Alabama law.127 The Eleventh Circuit noted 
that the language in Alabama’s wrongful death statute was “unique,” and an 
analysis of the state’s wrongful death case law would be helpful.128 After a lengthy 
review of Alabama case law, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that “[a]n executor’s 
wrongful death claim falls within the scope of a valid arbitration agreement 
between a nursing home and a decedent.”129 However, the Eleventh Circuit, though 
bound by Alabama law, made it clear that it did not agree with the result: “And 
because neither the decedent nor her estate ever owned the wrongful death claim, it 
would seem to follow that a decedent cannot bind the entity that would later own 
 ________________________  
 120. Id. 
 121. Entrekin v. Internal Med. Assocs. of Dothan, P.A., 689 F.3d 1248, 1259 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 122. Id. at 1249. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 1251.   
 126. Compare Laizure v. Avante at Leesburg, Inc., 44 So. 3d 1254, 1259 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010); with 
Entrekin, 689 F.3d at 1249.  
 127. Entrekin, 689 F.3d at 1251. 
 128. Id. at 1253. Alabama’s wrongful death statute provides:  
 
A personal representative may commence an action and recover such damages as the jury 
may assess in a court of competent jurisdiction within the State of Alabama . . . for the 
wrongful act, omission, or negligence of any person, persons, or corporation, his or her or 
their servants or agents, whereby the death of the testator or intestate was caused, provided 
the testator or intestate could have commenced an action for the wrongful act, omission, or 
negligence if it had not caused death. 
 
ALA. CODE § 6-5-410(a) (1975). 
 129. Id. at 1254. 
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the claim to arbitrate (the executor). But things are not always as they seem.”130 
Thus, states with derivative language in their wrongful death statutes, such as 
Texas and Alabama, will compel the arbitration of wrongful death claims when the 
deceased is the only person to sign the agreement because of the legislature’s intent 
in creating the statute. 
2.   Independent 
In Utah, a wife filed a wrongful death action against a physician alleging that 
the doctor’s negligent care caused her husband to commit suicide.131 The doctor 
filed a motion to compel arbitration of the wife’s wrongful death claim because the 
husband had entered into an arbitration agreement as a part of his initial intake 
agreement.132 The doctor argued that the wife should be bound by the agreement 
because Utah’s wrongful death statute applies to third parties when the claim arises 
out of the injury sustained by the person that signed the agreement.133 
Alternatively, the doctor argued that the wife should be bound by the agreement 
because she was an intended third-party beneficiary.134 The district court denied the 
doctor’s motion to compel arbitration holding that “since Mrs. Bybee did not sign 
the arbitration agreement, she was not bound by it and that she could not be bound 
under an agency or third-party beneficiary theory.”135 
Utah is unique because it has incorporated its wrongful death statute into the 
state’s constitution.136  Under Utah wrongful death law, a wrongful death plaintiff 
is not subject to all of the defenses a defendant would have had against a decedent 
because in Utah a wrongful death claim is a separate claim that comes into 
existence upon the death of the injured person.137 The court then distinguished 
states with wrongful death language that creates an independent cause of action 
with states that have language that creates a cause of action that is derivative of the 
decedent: 
Courts that compel nonsignatory heirs to abide by arbitration 
agreements often do so because under their law a wrongful death 
cause of action is wholly derivative of and dependent on the 
underlying personal injury claim… The independent nature of the 
wrongful death cause of action in Utah means that in our state the 
heirs in a wrongful death action stand in, at most, one shoe of the 
decedent.138  
 ________________________  
 130. Id. at 1253–54 (emphasis added). 
 131. Bybee v. Abdulla, 189 P.3d 40, 41 (Utah 2008).  
 132. Id.  
 133. Id. at 42. 
 134. Id.  
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 45. 
 137. Bybee, 189 P.3d at 46. 
 138. Id. 
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When reaching its conclusion, the court looked to a key point that Laizure did 
not: the type of defenses that are granted by statutory language should matter.139 
The court reasoned that typical negligence defenses go to the heart of the wrongful 
death claim, but procedural defenses, such as a pre-existing choice of forum 
agreement, do not implicate the viability of the underlying claim.140 In sum, the 
court made the distinction that the Legislature, by creating an independent cause of 
action in wrongful death claims, only intended typical negligence defenses to be 
applicable.141  
The court quickly dismissed the doctor’s third-party beneficiary argument by 
reasoning that the wife did not claim the benefit of some right for which she did not 
expressly bargain.142 The court rested on well-settled contract law that a third party 
may claim a contract benefit only if the parties to the contract clearly express an 
intention to confer a separate and distinct benefit on the third party.143 Comically, 
the court looked to the arbitration agreement which expressly named “all persons 
whose claims for injuries and losses arise out of medical care rendered … by [Dr. 
Abdulla]” to be bound by the agreement and found that “the intention to bind Mrs. 
Bybee is clear, [but] it is less apparent that the obligation to arbitrate was a 
‘separate and distinct benefit’ bestowed by her husband and Dr. Abdulla on her.”144 
The court did find that the wife intended to be the beneficiary of her husband’s 
good health, but these were only incidental benefits of the doctor–patient 
relationship which disappeared when he died.145  
The Missouri Supreme Court refused to enforce an arbitration agreement for 
nursing home care signed by the daughter of a patient acting as the patient’s 
attorney-in-fact.146 In Lawrence, the arbitration agreement signed by the patient’s 
daughter called for “any and all claims, disputes and controversies… shall be 
resolved exclusively by binding arbitration.”147 Shortly after being admitted, the 
patient died, and her son brought a claim against the nursing home under 
Missouri’s wrongful death statute.148 The nursing home filed a motion to compel 
arbitration and the circuit court denied the motion, reasoning that “the decedent’s 
 ________________________  
 139. Id. at 47. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id.  
 
While we are weary of announcing a categorical rule to distinguish between defenses that a 
decedent may successfully confer by contract on a defendant to assert against heirs in a 
wrongful death action, those least likely to be found enforceable are contract provisions that 
purport to affect the rights of heirs but do not affect the existence of the decedent’s personal 
injury claim during his lifetime.  
 
Id. 
 142. Bybee, 189 P.3d at 49. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 50. 
 146. Lawrence v. Beverly Manor, 273 S.W.3d 525, 526–27 (Mo. 2009) (en banc). 
 147. Id. at 526. 
 148. Id. 
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daughter was an agent for the purpose of securing residential treatment for the 
decedent during her lifetime, [and] nothing in the arbitration agreement can be 
construed to extend to new and independent causes of action . . . .”149  
Missouri’s wrongful death statutory language is close to identical with 
Florida’s.150 The court found that the language of the wrongful death act creates a 
new distinct cause of action and is distinct from any underlying tort claims.151 The 
court reasoned that since the patient could not be a party to her own wrongful death 
claim, then it is not possible for a claim for her wrongful death to be derivative of 
any agreements that related to her during her lifetime.152 Thus, the court, quite 
simply, held that “[t]he arbitration agreement, therefore, cannot bind parties to the 
wrongful death suit.”153 
D.   Recommendations for Changes 
The Court’s decision in Laizure made redress for family members that have 
lost a loved one due to a nursing home’s negligence an uphill battle that will likely 
end in arbitration. Yet, what fix is there for this? Unfortunately for Florida, our 
Court has set concrete precedent with little authority on which to stand. One 
solution, though highly improbable, would be a change to the FAA, which would 
automatically abrogate Laizure. If Congress were to change the FAA to expressly 
restrict the compulsion of arbitration clauses between statutory heirs in wrongful 
death claims, then the nursing home arbitration loophole would be shut. However, 
the Supreme Court of Florida has yet to accept to decide this issue, and it is highly 
likely that it never will because the issue is intertwined deeply in state contract law. 
Thus, the Supreme Court would not want to overreach, and the issue is nowhere 
near Congress’s radar.  
Another solution would be to add a section specifically for nursing-home 
litigation to Florida’s Wrongful Death Act. With the draconian effects the court has 
created, it should not be long until Floridians are demanding a change.  The Act 
already creates a distinct independent right of action, so it is not difficult to see 
what the Legislature intended when it created the Act. Alternatively, the 
Legislature could create a law that would provide for a clearer procedural process 
for understanding everything the new patient is agreeing to during the intake 
 ________________________  
 149. Id. at 526–27. 
 150. Id. Missouri’s statute states:  
 
Whenever the death of a person results from any act, conduct, occurrence, transaction, or 
circumstance which, if death had not ensued, would have entitled such person to recover 
damages in respect thereof, the person or party who, or the corporation which, would have 
been liable if death had not ensued shall be liable in an action for damages, notwithstanding 
the death of the person injured.  
 
MO. ANN. STAT. § 537.080 (West 2013). 
 151. Lawrence, 273 S.W.3d at 527. 
 152. Id. at 529. 
 153. Id. 
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process. The solution could involve making a statute that demands the presence of 
next-of-kin in the formation of any agreements that call for the compulsion of 
binding arbitration. Furthermore, since very few people are even able to understand 
what they are agreeing to, an informational video recording informing the patient 
of the statutory and constitutional rights he or she is waiving could be beneficial in 
making these decisions.     
CONCLUSION 
On balance, the 72,000 nursing home residents in Florida are currently being 
subjected to what the Supreme Court of Florida five years ago commonly held to 
be unconscionable contracts. After Laizure, the prospects of equal bargaining have 
become distant because now when an elderly person dies in a nursing home, an 
arbitrator hired by the nursing home will decide whether or not the contract was 
unconscionable. Freedom of contract only goes so far. Laizure has shut the door to 
our courts in the face of families with loved ones in nursing homes.    
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